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HOW WILL THE PROPOSED EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT AFFECT LABOR 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES? 
 
CHRISTOPHER STEWART 
University of Rhode Island 
 
The Employee Free Choice Act was one of 
the most highly publicized issues during the 
2008 presidential election. This proposed 
legislation, if enacted, would profoundly change 
current labor law in the United States. The 
legislation consists of three sections that 
represent an overall policy of facilitating union 
organizing, and by consequence, collective 
bargaining. The three sections provide for 
streamlined union certification, guaranteed first 
contracts for newly certified unions, and 
increased penalties for employer misconduct 
during the process. Given the current sentiment 
in the United States toward unions, CEOs, and 
the prevailing economic uncertainty, there is no 
shortage of opinions on this proposed 
legislation. Consequently, an analysis of the 
legislation with special consideration of 
potential unintended impacts is in order. 
WAGNER ACT HISTORY 
The legislation that the Employee Free 
Choice Act (EFCA) is proposed to alter is the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) also 
known as the Wagner Act. In analyzing the 
EFCA, it is helpful to consider the origins of the 
NLRA. The failed predecessor of that legislation 
was President Franklin Roosevelt's National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1934, which 
was part of the new deal. That legislation had a 
number of provisions aimed at spurring 
economic recovery, including a provision for 
collective bargaining between employers and 
employees. Specifically, section 7(a) of that 
legislation mandated employers provide 
employees “...the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing...free from the interference, restraint, 
or coercion of employers.” Labor leaders hailed 
this as a Magna Carta for organized labor 
(Rosenzweig & Lichtenstein, 2008). An 
onslaught of organizing ensued with the battle 
cry, “The president wants you to join a union.” 
This was the impression President Roosevelt had 
given working America when he stated, “If I 
worked in a factory, I'd join a union.” The NIRA 
eventually failed as it had no provision for 
enforcement and it was ultimately determined to 
be unconstitutional in the United States Supreme 
Court Case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
The NIRA gave way to the Wagner Act of 
1935. Crafted by the Senator whose name it 
bears, and his advisor, Leon Keyserling, this 
legislation granted employees the rights to 
organize, bargain collectively, and engage in 
concerted activity. Though it is clear that is what 
the act was specifically intended to do, the 
question is why was it deemed important to do 
it? There are numerous theories. Kaufman, in his 
comprehensive work, Why the Wagner Act?  
indicates, “...the fundamental point behind the 
Wagner Act [is] that unions are to be 
encouraged precisely because they do raise 
wages (Kaufman, 1996).”  Kaufman goes on to 
indicate that remarks made by Keyserling, the 
chief architect of the Wagner Act, indicate that it 
was part of a coordinated macroeconomic 
program intended to combat the depression 
through two related means: stabilization of the 
wage-price structure and promotion of consumer 
purchasing power. 
Gross, in analyzing what he refers to as 
conflicting statutory purposes of the NLRA, 
interprets statements from the same source, Leon 
Keyserling, with more of an industrial justice 
theme. He advances the position that the act was 
designed to, “make the worker a free man 
(Gross, 1985). He concludes that, “[Wagner] 
considered the advancement of economic and 
social justice, rather than the reduction of 
industrial strife, to be the primary objective of 
the Wagner Act (Gross, 1985)” 
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It is worth noting that these two scholars, 
after extensive research of the same sources of 
material, have come to somewhat different 
conclusions as to what the real original intent of 
this legislation was. Additionally, their 
summations are different from the purpose of the 
act implied in its own policy statement; “It is 
hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
States to eliminate the causes of certain 
substantial obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these 
obstructions...” 
In considering of the Wagner Act, it seems 
that its true purpose can be grouped into four 
possible categories:  
1. Balance of employer/employee power,  
2. Facilitating employee domination,  
3. Facilitating employer domination, or  
4. Overall positive macroeconomic impact. 
 
Regardless of the underlying motivation, the 
intent of the act is clear. Senator Wagner and 
President Roosevelt, possibly for different 
reasons, wanted workers to form unions, and 
bargain collectively with employers. 
In that respect, the Wagner Act had the 
desired effect. It began a period of 
unprecedented unionization, and by 
consequence, collective bargaining. Union 
membership and density effectively doubled in 
the three year period after the bill was enacted 
(Troy, 1985). Additionally, the United States 
experienced the economic recovery that may 
have been the underlying purpose of the act. To 
what extent that outcome is attributable to the 
Wagner Act is debatable as the recovery was 
proximate in time to not only the act, but also 
other new deal legislation, economic policy, as 
well as turmoil in Europe. 
The Wagner Act was modified in 1947 with 
the Taft-Hartley Amendments, otherwise known 
as the Labor-Management Relations Act. These 
amendments put limitations on some of the 
successes the unions had enjoyed as a result of 
the passage of the Wagner Act. Certain practices 
by unions that were seen as inappropriately 
usurping control of companies were eliminated. 
Most notable, in light of considering the 
Employee Free Choice Act, these amendments 
eliminated previous restrictions on employers 
openly contesting unions' organization attempts. 
Additionally, the new legislation provided for 
unfair labor practices by unions and a process 
for their decertification. The Taft-Hartley 
Amendments and the Wagner Act have been 
combined with other legislation to form what is 
today's National Labor Relations Act. The act 
provides for the establishment of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as its primary 
enforcement agency. 
DECLINE OF UNIONS 
In analyzing labor statistics furnished by the 
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, it is evident that there has been a 
steady decline in union rates since the 1950’s. 
There are many theories on why this is the case, 
but little consensus. Explanations tend to fall 
into one of two broad categories. First, 
decreased union rates have been caused by 
economic factors. “Labor economists typically 
stress economic explanations, which vary from 
compositional shifts in the job structure due to 
increased competition both domestically and 
internationally (Wachter, 2007).” Along these 
lines, globalization has been blamed for the 
decline in union membership by causing a 
decline in demand for union jobs. Additionally, 
the shift in the United States to a service based 
economy has contributed to this effect. 
Manufacturing jobs have been off-shored. These 
are the industries that were traditionally heavily 
unionized. These jobs disappeared and were 
largely replaced with service sector jobs. Jobs in 
this sector traditionally are not strongly 
unionized.  
The other category that is attributed with 
causing union decline is legal in nature. “Labor 
law commentators naturally focus on labor law 
explanations, such as the difficulty of controlling 
management opposition to unions” (Wachter, 
2007). Examples of this sort of management 
opposition are intimidation of employees for 
union activity, termination of employees 
attempting to organize unions, interfering with 
the union certification process, and refusing to 
bargain with a union.  
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This is the perspective that his given rise to 
the EFCA. It is these alleged patterns of 
behavior that employers have engaged in that the 
new legislation specifically addresses. 
Proponents of this school of thought believe that 
the way to address the problem is to adjust the 
existing law.  
ORGANIZATION AND ELECTION 
PROCESS 
Current Process 
Years of case law from federal courts as 
well as the National Labor Relations Board, 
have put into effect the current system of union 
recognition that the EFCA seeks to alter. Under 
the current statute there are three ways for a 
union to form. They all essentially begin in the 
same manner. The associated group of interested 
employees and/or non employee organizers will 
embark on a campaign to form a union. In doing 
so, the fabled union recognition cards are 
distributed to the employees who are to be 
included in the new union.  A “card count” of 
the recognition cards that are signed and 
returned ensues. The cards are required have 
language indicating that the signer authorizes the 
union to bargain for them in reference to wages, 
hours, and working conditions, or that he is 
requesting an election to certify the union. 
The card count is an attempt to show, by 
cards signed by employees, that there are 
grounds to recognize the union as the bargaining 
agent for the concerned employees. If the union 
can demonstrate this, and convince the employer 
to recognize the card count, they can then assert 
themselves as the bargaining unit. Having been 
recognized by the employer, the union then 
would file a petition to the NLRB for 
certification as the employee's sole agent for 
bargaining. 
According to the United States Supreme 
Court Case, NLRB vs. Gissel, authorization 
cards were found to not be inherently unreliable, 
but employers are not acting in bad faith by 
refusing to recognize the union on the basis of 
them. Consequently, if the union organizers 
have demonstrated over 30% employee interest 
through recognition cards, the employer is 
within its right to force an election. This is the 
second way a union can achieve employer 
recognition and NLRB certification. The union 
would file a petition with the NLRB for a 
“Certification of Representative” election. The 
employer then has to respond to the NLRB and 
file either a consent to the election, which 
provides for the NLRB regional director to settle 
any objections, or a stipulation, which allows 
ultimately for judicial remedy to any objections.  
The election is then scheduled, and the 
employer has seven days to forward a list of 
names and addresses of the employees to be 
represented by the union to the NLRB. The 
election ideally commences in approximately 
four to six weeks.  
The NLRB sends out notices of the election 
to the employers, which are to be posted. The 
NLRB will then, on the assigned date, conduct 
the election. This is done in the presence of 
representatives from both sides. In order to win 
the election, the union must only obtain the 
majority of ballots cast by employees who 
actually vote. If they lose, they have to wait ten 
months to start another organization campaign, 
and one year to attempt another election. In any 
case, if either side has an objection to the 
election results, they must go on record within 
five working days.  
The final way a union can be certified by the 
NLRB occurs when an employer has embarked 
on a pattern of behavior that is so egregious 
against the union as to make a fair election 
impossible. In such cases it is within the power 
of the NLRB to certify the union in question 
against any objection offered by the offending 
employer. The employer is compelled to bargain 
by the NLRB's issuance of what is sometimes 
called a “Gissel Order.” This name is derived 
from the previously cited Supreme Court case 
which provides for such an order.  
Upon NLRB certification of the union, the 
employer is compelled by law to engage in 
collective bargaining under section 8(a)(5) of the 
NLRA. Failure to do so is characterized as an 
unfair labor practice. Committing such an act 
will result in penalties against the employer.  
The penalties for unfair labor practices are 
set out in the legislation. They are modest by 
anyone’s estimates, consisting solely of a NLRB 
issued order to bargain. This results in criticism 
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of the current law's ability to ensure that 
employers abide by the requirements of the 
NLRA in terms of not inappropriately 
interfering in organization campaigns, 
certification elections, and collective bargaining. 
It's these points that the EFCA seeks to alter 
presumably to the benefit of workers: Streamline 
the certification process so that the choice of an 
election is in the hands of the union, Forcing the 
parties to interest arbitration where a first 
contract cannot be achieved, and increasing 
penalties where the employer commits unfair 
labor practices. Thus begins the examination of 
the EFCA. 
Section 1 of EFCA 
The first section of the new legislation 
relates to how union certification elections are 
administered by the NLRA. This is a major 
alteration of a process that has been in effect 
since the genesis of the Wagner Act in 1935. It 
is described in section two of the EFCA entitled, 
Streamlining Union Certification. That is exactly 
what the legislation's language provides for. 
As indicated in the previous section, a card 
showing of 30% or more of the members of the 
intended union will entitle them to a NLRB 
administered certification election. Under the 
new legislation, this will not change. What the 
new legislation does is add a provision 
mandating NLRB certification in any case where 
the union in question can demonstrate interest by 
a majority of the employees. This is done by 
obtaining signed recognition cards from 50 % of 
the employees plus one. This is indicated by 
proponents of EFCA as the primary major 
benefit of the legislation (United States 
Congress, 2007). It is important to note the 
distinction that in an election under current law, 
it is only the majority of those who actually 
show up to vote that is necessary for a 
certification. Under an EFCA card check 
certification, it is necessary for a majority of the 
entire potential union membership to authorize 
the union as its bargaining agent.  
In reference to this, it is important to 
remember that under the current legislation, 
unions almost never request a certification 
election with as few as 30 % of the potential 
union members signing cards (Bronfenbrenner, 
1994; Ferguson, 2008). Organizers refer to what 
is called the “15% drop” in reference to the 
amount of cards they think they need to produce 
to have a reasonable chance at a successful 
election. That is, if they hold 30 % of cards, they 
would expect to only receive 15 % of the vote in 
a certification election where they have to 
capture 50 % plus 1 of the votes cast for a 
victory. Consequently, organizers indicate that 
they will hold out for 70 % or more of cards 
before considering an election. The implication 
is that elections do not occur as often as may 
have been intended under the original NLRA 
legislation.  
By allowing for union recognition with a 
showing of 50 % plus 1, the election process is 
bypassed. It is this aspect of the legislation that 
provides for the biggest battleground over the 
EFCA. EFCA proponents assert that the election 
process has been so subverted by business 
interests, NLRB members and employees with 
anti-union or pro business agendas, that a valid 
and fair election is a near impossibility. By 
contrast, EFCA opponents point to peer pressure 
and coercive tactics used by unions and union 
sympathetic employees to pressure other 
employees to sign recognition cards, and 
consequently interfere with their First 
Amendment right of free association.  
Management Tactics EFCA Attempts to 
Address 
Undeniably, management has the capacity to  
profoundly affect the ability of a union to 
organize in their workplace. Management 
opposition in one form or another has been 
found to be a key determinant of NLRB election 
outcomes. Many believe that increased 
opposition has been a major cause of the 
precipitous fall in private sector union density 
over the past two decades (Freeman & Kleiner, 
1990). Further findings indicate that 
“...management opposition, reflected particularly 
in the actions of supervisors, is a key component 
in union inability to organize workers in the 
United States” (Freeman & Kleiner, 1990) 
The importance of these findings is revealed 
when one considers the potential impact of 
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EFCA on attempts, legitimate or otherwise, by 
employers to interfere with unionization 
campaigns. Freeman and Kleiner conducted a 
study of the use of management tactics and their 
effects surveys of both employers and 
organizers. “Supervisory opposition is the most 
important management action to deter 
unionization” (Freeman & Kleiner, 1990). The 
effects of supervisory opposition on union 
campaign success are magnified when they are 
able to protract the certification process. 
It is the tactics that these managers use that 
fuel the debate for the necessity and 
appropriateness of the EFCA. The Taft-Hartley 
Amendments afforded employers rights for 
making a case, during an organization drive, 
against unionization. Specifically, it is provided 
that, “The expressing of any views, argument or 
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in 
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall 
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor 
practice under any of the provisions of this Act, 
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal 
or force or promise of benefit.”  
Prior to that, any interference was 
punishable under section 8 of the NLRA as an 
unfair labor practice. In the post Taft-Hartley 
period, employers are able to enjoy almost 
unrestricted access to employees for the purpose 
of campaigning against the union. When doing 
so, the distinction between threats and 
“predictions” of adverse consequences can 
become a legal battleground causing a damaging 
delay to the organizing campaign (Drummonds, 
2007). 
Specific tactics include such things as 
mandating employees attend captive audience 
and supervisor “one on one” meetings. Also, 
employers retain lawyers and consultants to 
advise them on how to thwart unionization. 
Proponents of EFCA argue that this unrestricted 
access to employees during working hours 
constitutes an unfair advantage. In contrast, non 
employee union organizers are afforded limited 
access to workers at the workplace under United 
States Supreme Court case law (Lechmere Inc. 
v. NLRB). In addition, restrictions are placed on 
employee organizer's activities when on the 
employer's property.  
This speaks to the inherent conflict between 
workers’ rights afforded by the NLRA and 
employers’ property rights under common law.  
Opponents of EFCA might discount arguments 
that employers are afforded an unfair advantage, 
indicating that the use of mandatory meetings 
and consultants are a logical counter campaign 
to the unions' organizing efforts. That however, 
does not account for the notion that the original 
Wagner Act never intended to make this process 
fair. There is the position that the purpose of that 
legislation was to give the employees the 
advantage in the union organizing campaign to 
counter the disproportionate power of the 
employer, who controls the workplace (Gross, 
1985).  
Employers' use of captive audience meetings 
and consultants is legal and would be 
characterized by EFCA proponents as less 
egregious attacks on organizing. Other, more 
egregious tactics are said to be employed with 
devastating effect. One of the most devastating 
tactics that has been used by employers to avoid 
unionization has been termination of employee 
organizers. Part of the problem with the existing 
legislation that has allowed this phenomenon is 
the modest penalties associated with it. If an 
employer employs this tactic, he could typically 
remove the employee organizer's influence and 
enthusiasm from the process, thus injuring the 
election. This would have the added effect of 
intimidating other employees.  
The NLRB does not have accurate statistics 
on the number of employees terminated for these 
reasons, as many cases are settled prior to 
adjudication. However, the NLRB annual report 
for fiscal year 2007 does indicate that “alleged 
illegal discharge or other discrimination against 
employees was the second largest category [of 
unfair labor practice brought] against employers, 
comprising 6853 charges, in about 45.6 % of the 
total charges” (NLRB Annual Report FY2007). 
Additionally, the annual report indicates that 
the NLRB awarded back pay of $117.3 million 
dollars for the year (id.). One has to keep in 
mind that these back pay awards may be multi 
year awards. Considering these factors, it seems 
very likely that employers are using these 
terminations to some extent to illegally influence 
the certification process.  In some findings it is 
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estimated that, “over the current decade, illegal 
firings have marred over one-in-four NLRB-
sponsored union elections, reaching 30 % of 
elections in 2007” (Schmitt & Zipperer, 2009).”   
Yet in a opposing view presented by the 
Center for Union Facts, it is indicated that the 
impact of illegal terminations on the process is 
less dramatic. In analyzing the associated statics, 
that finding is that, “ ...a maximum of 3.75 % of 
union organization campaigns included an 
unlawful termination.” and, “ ...the number of 
employees fired during elections is insignificant 
(Wilson, 2009). In those findings, it is  indicated 
that 158 cases for fiscal year 2007 did not have a 
significant impact on the unionization process. 
However, this opinion does not account for how 
this action impacts and intimidates employees 
other than those who are terminated. Also 
consider that in four back pay cases decided in 
September 2007, the discriminatory acts 
occurred in 1999,1996,1990, and 1997-an 
average of 11 years ago (Drummonds, 2007).  
One would have to consider what impact this 
had on fellow employees. 
Additional employer actions alleged to have 
a profound impact on union success rates are 
any tactics that prolong the election process. 
One in particular is objecting to some aspect of 
the election so as to cause delay. The longer the 
employer can do this, the more time they can 
take advantage of their access to employees to 
perpetuate their position against unionization. 
These delays have a severe impact. In her study, 
Kate Bronfenbrenner illustrated that when this 
occurs, success rates fell from 47% to 23 % 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1994). EFCA proponents 
would indicate that this is an unfair manipulation 
of the system, and injecting delay in the process 
interferes with the intent of the NLRA. 
Opponents would pose that it is a legitimate 
tactic not precluded by law. 
Elimination of Procedural Delay 
By altering the legislation, the EFCA's 
authors are creating a system where the 
employer can no longer compel the union in 
question to a NLRA sponsored election to 
achieve certification. With the elimination of the 
election process, the authors are eliminating the 
period between the recognition petition, card 
count, and the election. This is the time during 
which employers are able to conduct their 
counter campaigns. Consequently, this is the 
time where most of the employer abuses are 
likely to occur. By minimizing this time, 
organizers will be subjected to less of the 
employer's tactics cited above.  
Of concern to EFCA opponents is that union 
organizers would be able to conduct “blitz” 
campaigns. That is, they would potentially be 
able to organize and be certified as the 
bargaining agents by the NLRB before the 
employer has a chance to react. While this 
would minimize the employers ability to commit 
unfair labor practices, it would also prevent 
them from exercising rights to assert their 
position on unionization that they have been 
granted under the existing legislation and 
associated case law. The new legislation seeks to 
mitigate employer unfair labor practices in 
exchange for usurping the employers First 
Amendment right to mount a legal campaign 
against an organizing attempt. Employers are 
within their rights to hire consultants and mount 
an anti union campaign as long as it is not based 
on threats or coercion. 
The specter of the “blitz” campaign is not as 
grievous a tool as EFCA opponents may think it 
is. In fact, the argument has been made 
previously in the NLRB v. Gissel decision that 
organizers could mount the secret campaign on 
the basis of cards, circumventing the rights 
given to employers under the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments. The convening Supreme Court 
indicated that this would be an unlikely 
occurrence. This is due to the fact that 
organizers would lose very important protections 
afforded them under the NLRA by doing this. If 
the employer is not aware that an organizing 
campaign is underway, that employer cannot be 
found to have committed an unfair labor 
practice. Consequently, in many, if not most 
cases, organizers would make a clear and 
unambiguous notice to the employer that a 
campaign is underway to achieve those 
protections.  
Organizers would have to decide if they 
would risk forgoing the NLRA protections in 
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favor of a secret campaign. The advantage here 
would be to eliminate the negative effect of the 
employer's anti-union campaign. If the 
organizers efforts could truly be kept secret, they 
would clearly have the advantage because the 
employer would not be aware of a reason to 
commit any of the unfair labor practices 
associated with an organizing campaign.  
Organizer Coercion 
Critics of the EFCA indicate a belief that 
employee and organizer peer pressure and 
coercion to sign recognition cards will become 
routine. It is unknown to what level this will 
have an effect. Indeed it is alleged that this is 
occurring now under existing legislation. Much 
of the congressional testimony on the EFCA 
alleges that this is currently the case 
(Congressional Report 110-4). Testimony was 
given as to how organizers would harass and 
coerce prospective union members for the 
purpose of having them sign interest cards. 
Many witnesses indicated that they signed the 
cards in an effort to get the organizers to leave.  
Additionally the National Right to Work 
Committee indicates that this is a rampant 
practice in union organizing (Facts & Issues, 
2009). As with the congressional testimony, the 
evidence presented to justify this is anecdotal. 
There is a decided absence of hard statistical 
data on such events from an unbiased source. 
In reference to misrepresentation, similar 
events are alluded to. “ There is extensive 
evidence of signatures on cards being solicited 
based on claims the cards are requests for 
information or a “showing of interest” so a 
meeting can be held or pizza bought for 
employees, or for the union organizer to show 
“my boss I'm doing my job,” or even as lottery 
tickets.”(Seaton & Rusham, 2009)  
Again these issues are not new, and were 
addressed by the US Supreme Court in Gissel. In 
that ruling, the court indicated that “...the same 
pressures are likely to be present in an 
election.(NLRB v. Gissel)” The 
misrepresentation as to the intent of the cards 
was also addressed at that time. Employers 
asserting the same concern were advised that the 
NLRB's Cumberland Shoe Doctrine dictates 
“...if the card itself is unambiguous (i.e., states 
on its face that the signer authorizes the union to 
represent the employee for collective bargaining 
purposes and not to seek an election), it will be 
counted unless it is proved that the employee 
was told that the card was to be used solely for 
the purpose of obtaining an election.(id.)”  
Here the distinction between single purpose 
and dual purpose cards becomes important. 
Currently, single purpose cards would typically 
indicate that the signatory authorizes the 
indicated union to bargain on their behalf. The 
issue here is that this card, under current 
legislation would likely result in an election. 
Also, a single purposes card might indicate that 
the employee in question wants an election. A 
dual purpose card would contain language to 
cover both contingencies. 
Clearly, the current system lends to abuses 
by organizers in the form of misrepresentation or 
coercion. It is not known to what extent. It 
follows logically that by passing EFCA, the 
stakes of a card campaign are increased. As 
such, one would expect a greater rate of 
misconduct on the part of organizers, and a spike 
in these events as the amount of organizing 
campaigns increases. These sorts of events can 
be addresses under the existing legislation as 
union unfair labor practices. 
Can the EFCA Fix these Problems? 
All of these potential or actual abuses aside, 
the debate over the card check clause of the 
EFCA can be reduced to a very simple formula. 
Do employees want to be in unions? If so, do 
they currently have a reasonable access to 
unionization? If not, would this provision of the 
EFCA remedy that? An analysis of existing data 
provided by the NLRA and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics may give a simple picture of what, if 
anything should be done to facilitate greater 
access to unionization and by consequence, 
collective bargaining.  
It is not disputed that since the high point of 
unionization in the United States, that union 
rates and membership numbers have been in 
steady decline. Current membership rate for 
private sector employees in unions is 7.6% 
(NLRB Annual Report FY2007). This puts the 
rate at pre-Wagner act levels. As we have seen, 
the different camps have different opinions as to 
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why this is the case. Essentially, EFCA 
proponents would make the case that this 
condition is caused by a combination of 
inadequate legislation, and abuses perpetrated by 
employers. EFCA opponents would indicate that 
this decline is driven by employee preference, 
abuses committed by unions with an agenda to 
perpetuate themselves through the collection of 
dues, and globalization. Also put forth is the 
position that, ...”[Organized labor] is simply not 
as important as it once was, because the 
government has an alphabet soup of agencies 
dedicated to protecting the rights of American 
workers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
OSHA and the Family and Medical Leave Act 
make the need for unions far less 
acute(Goldberg, 2009).” So the first question is 
to try to establish to what degree the average 
worker in United States private industry wants 
access to unionization and collective bargaining.  
The Worker Representation and 
Participation Survey (WRPS) was a yearlong 
study that began in 1994. It was directed by 
Richard Freeman of Harvard University and Joel 
Rogers of the University of Wisconsin. The 
purpose of that study was, “...to provide an in-
depth survey of employee attitudes toward 
current work organization and human resource 
practices and toward different forms of 
workplace participation and representation 
(Freeman & Rogers, 1999).” To that ends a 26 
minute telephone survey was conducted with 
2408 employees participating. The key to the 
survey was, “Three big questions and their 
answers (id.):” Do employees want greater 
participation and representation at their 
workplaces than is currently provided? What do 
employees see as essential to attaining their 
desired level of participation and representation? 
What solutions do employees favor to resolve 
any gap between their desired 
participation/representation and what they 
currently have?  
In the data collected from the answers to 
these questions, the WPRS indicates that most 
American employees want more involvement 
and greater say in their jobs. The majority would 
favor a workplace organization to provide them 
with group as well as individual voice. 
Interestingly, the majority of workers polled 
indicated that they would prefer to attempt this 
through “joint consultive committee's” with a 
“sizable minority” wanting a union or union like 
organization (id.).  
The findings indicate that at least the 
majority of those polled indicated that they 
wanted to enjoy benefits associated with 
collective bargaining; they would prefer to 
achieve them without having to join a union. 
The survey further indicates that the benefits that 
workers are looking to secure are not just 
monetary. They are looking for greater voice 
and input in the workplace and the ability to 
choose their own representatives to achieve this.  
In 2007, Richard Freeman conducted an 
analysis of his original WRPS results alongside 
some more current indicators of possible interest 
in unionization. His analysis incorporated data 
from polls conducted by Peter D. Hart Research 
Associates from 1993 through 1995 (AFL-CIO 
Labor Day Survey, 2005). The question of 
interest for Freeman was one asked of non-union 
workers. Specifically, they were asked if they 
would vote for or against a union. The key 
finding in this regard, as indicated by Freeman, 
is “ In 2002 the proportion of workers who said 
they would vote for a union rose above the 
proportion that said they would vote against a 
union for the first time in any national survey: a 
majority of nonunion workers now desire union 
representation in their workplace (Freeman, 
2007).” According to Freeman this indicates an 
increased desire for unions among workers with 
an ultimate goal of achieving a reduction in the 
“gap” between participation and representation 
in the workplace.  
However, like every aspect of the EFCA, 
there are dissenting studies indicating that the 
American workforce has a different desire than 
that asserted by Freeman. Zogby International 
concluded a similar study in 2006. Their 
telephone survey asked of nonunion households, 
“If an election were held tomorrow to decide 
whether your workplace would be unionized or 
not, do you think you would vote [for or against] 
a union (Zogby, 2006)? Ultimately they report 
35% of respondents voting for with a clear 
majority of 58% voting against. The conclusion 
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of that survey, and another conducted the 
previous year is that, “Most American workers 
seem more inclined to view organized labor as 
something that may benefit their neighbors, but 
is not necessarily a benefit to them personally 
(Peck, 2005).” 
The issue of whether or not American 
workers want to be unions is further complicated 
by a recent Gallup poll. Conducted March 14-
15, 2009, the poll asked respondents, “Generally 
speaking, would you favor or oppose a new law 
that would make it easier for labor unions to 
organize workers?”  Their results indicate 53% 
of those surveyed as being in favor of such a law 
while 39% would oppose that law. The balance 
of 8% tendered no opinion. Gallup indicates a 
belief that the crisis of the current economy, 
along with corporate bailouts and the bonus 
scandal, has fostered an environment of 
increased sympathy for working people and 
unions. Consequently, they postulate that the 
time is right for proponents of the EFCA to win 
passage of the law in the House and Senate 
(Saad, 2009).  
There seems to be a possible indication of 
increased interest by employees to organize into 
unions. Therefore, the next question would be; 
do they have reasonable assess to unions? An 
analysis of data from the NLRB's annual report 
would give an indication as to what degree of 
success employees are having at organizing 
under the existing legislation. This question 
becomes very complicated because of the 
number of variables involved. An initial analysis 
of the NLRB data initially implies that unions 
are doing quite well when it comes to 
certification elections. Over the past ten years, 
unions have won certification in just under half 
of the election staged, and maintain a positive 
net increase in union members (NLRB Annual 
Report FY2007). This, on its face, would imply 
a fair and equitable system in the certification 
process. However, this analysis omits a number 
of important factors. The long term trend has 
been for a steady decline in union density (an 
expression of the percent of the labor force in 
unions), overall numbers of union members, and 
the number of elections. Over the past ten years 
alone there has been over 200 elections per year 
reduction in the number of elections held. This 
gives credibility to the arguments that employer 
interference is taking its toll on the process; 
fewer employees are willing to submit to the 
process, and the fact that organizers wait until 
they have a super majority of recognition cards 
before they initiate an election. At best, the 
question of whether employees are getting the 
appropriate access to organizing and elections is 
inconclusive without a more detailed analysis 
consisting of analyzing the available statistics 
along with actually interviewing the stake 
holders. 
Additionally, these statistics are not fully 
indicative of the state of collective bargaining in 
the United States. For Fiscal years 1996 to 2004, 
the FMCS helped settle an average of 
approximately 250 first contracts per year. Cases 
where an employer voluntarily recognized a 
union and reached a first contract without FMCS 
assistance are not tracked by the FMCS or 
NLRB. Consequently, there is some collective 
bargaining taking place in the workplace beyond 
the detection of the federal government (United 
States Cong., 2007). 
For the sake of analysis, we can conclude 
that employees are not be afforded the access 
that was initially envisioned by the authors of 
the Wagner Act. Consequently, the next phase of 
the analysis is in order. The question becomes 
will this section of the EFCA facilitate more 
unionization, and consequently, more collective 
bargaining?  
Logic would indicate that this would be the 
case. By all accounts, this legislation would 
remove many of the legal, and illegal tactics 
employers might employ to thwart the 
organizing process. Not only would the increase 
be due to effectively streamlining the existing 
process, but also from the likely increased 
amount of organizing campaigns that will result.  
Events studied in Canada give some 
indication of what effect the EFCA will have on 
organizing campaigns and their success. Prior to 
1977, all ten Canadian provinces allowed for 
card check recognition. The union in question 
would be certified as the bargaining agent if the 
number of cards they had met a certain 
threshold. This was from 50% to 55% depending 
on the province in question (United States 
Cong., 2007). In that year, five provinces 
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adopted new systems requiring mandatory 
voting consisting of a secret ballot election. 
Subsequent studies comparing union success 
rates for the two systems were conducted. First, 
a broad study of nine provinces was conducted. 
Compiling data from those nine provinces over 
the period from 1978 to 1996 revealed findings 
that are not surprising. A success rate nine points 
higher was realized by card check over secret 
ballot elections. 
Additionally, a more specific study was 
conducted in reference to organizing success in 
the Canadian province of British Columbia. That 
province allowed union recognition until 1984. 
From 1984 to 1993, they defaulted to a system 
of requiring a secret ballot election. Again 
results are consistent with most expectations. 
During an eleven year period where card checks 
were allowed, the union success rate was 91%. 
The success rate drops to 73% for those years 
where secret ballot voting was mandatory. The 
other effect that was realized where the card 
check system was used was more attempts at 
unionization. During the period where card 
checks were allowed, the average number of 
attempts was 531. Where secret ballot voting 
was mandatory, the amount of attempts dropped 
to an average of 242 (United States Cong., 
2007). 
Finally, an increased success rate for union 
certification should result from the mitigation of 
delay in the process. The streamlined, short 
duration process will create a condition that will 
allow for diminished efforts on the part of 
employers to thwart certification. All of the 
above factors considered together seem to 
bestow organizers with an opportunity for 
increased and more effective organizing 
campaigns. In this regard, the EFCA seems to be 
able to deliver what its authors intended. 
Other Considerations 
Consider that under the current system, there 
must be at least a 30% showing, through cards, 
that the entire prospective union members are 
interested in certifying the union. Then, the 
employer can compel an election where a simple 
majority of those who show up to vote will 
result in a union certification. In the new system, 
there must be a showing of interest, via cards, by 
a simple majority of the entire unit. It is the case 
now that most organizers will attempt to get 
significantly more than half of the unit to sign 
cards. Many prospective union members may be 
signing cards in an effort to appease a pushy 
organizer. Under the new system it would be 
incumbent upon these employees to be more 
sincere in their indications of union interest on 
the cards. Even if organizers mislead them about 
the purposes of the cards, without a doubt, an 
employer would make it known that signing the 
card will result in a union certification. 
Employees will be held more responsible for 
signing these cards. As with most contracts in 
the United States, signing these cards would 
become a binding issue. 
EFCA proponents have taken pains to 
indicate that EFCA will not eliminate the 
certification election. It is their assertion that the 
legislation simply takes that choice away from 
the employer. The employees will have the right 
to call an election. The idea is that if there is a 
segment of the prospective union members that 
do not want affiliation with the union in 
question, they would be able to request an 
election from the NLRB to not have the union 
certified. However the problem is that this is not 
expressly provided for under the EFCA. There is 
no procedure for how this would work. The 
disinterested employees would seemingly have 
to show disinterest in the form of a card count. 
Having done that, they could petition the NLRB 
for the election. The problem for them would be 
at the point the new unit was certified through 
the simple majority card count, they would be 
granted protections against decertification. 
Specifically, they would be barred from 
decertifying that unit for a period of one year. 
This is not the same as simply shifting the right 
to call an election from the employer to the 
employees.  
The employee organizers would not be 
likely to petition for such an election either. This 
is because of the 15 % drop phenomenon. If they 
have 50 % plus one of the cards, by these 
projections, they will not win the election. They 
have no incentive to petition for the election. If 
they have a guarantee of immediate recognition , 
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unions will never choose the election (Seaton & 
Ruhsam, 2009). 
ARBITRATION 
Current Process 
After a union is certified as the exclusive 
bargaining agent for employees, its position is 
not without peril. The real test of how effective 
this attempt at management and labor 
cooperation will be is the negotiating of the first 
collective bargaining agreement. It is this 
agreement that is the blueprint for how the 
company and employees will interact during 
future operations. This document will grant and 
guarantee the compensation levels of the 
involved employees. Even more importantly, the 
agreement sets the rules for how much say the 
employees will have in how the workplace 
functions. To this degree, it is the document 
where the company effectively surrenders a 
portion of their management prerogative. As 
such, they tend to be very deliberate in how they 
proceed toward this collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Under the current law, an employer is 
required by section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA to 
bargain with a certified union. The employer and 
union are required to bargain on wages, hours 
and working conditions. Failure by either party 
to negotiate on these grounds constitutes an 
unfair labor practice. These unfair labor 
practices are commonly referred to as failure to 
bargain, refusal to bargain, and bargaining in 
bad faith. These infractions are punishable under 
the NLRA; however, this punishment generally 
consists solely of an order to submit to 
bargaining. Only in the past few years has the 
NLRB taken a more forceful stance on these 
failures to bargaining. This policy for attempting 
to add additional remedies has its origins in the 
NLRB's Office of the General Counsel. The 
General Counsel is independent from the Board 
and is responsible for the investigation and 
prosecution of unfair labor practice cases and for 
the general supervision of the NLRB field 
offices in the processing of cases. 
The current General Counsel, Ronald 
Meisburg, has indicated a belief that when bad 
faith bargaining has occurred, merely ordering 
the parties to bargain may not return the parties 
to the “status quo ante (Meisburg, 2007).” 
Additional measures are advocated, such as 
seeking an extension of the certification year, 
allowing union access to bulletin boards, 
mandating periodic reports on the status of 
bargaining, and reimbursement of bargaining 
and litigation expenses by the employer. It is 
advocated that these remedies be sought in cases 
involving first contracts, as the union is at that 
point, still in a tenuous position in regards to its 
longevity. Although this is the position of the 
General Counsel, the Board itself seldom adds 
these provisions, saving them for the most 
egregious cases. 
While it is stipulated that unions, as well as 
employers, engage in bad faith bargaining, 
clearly the General Counsel's statements on the 
matter indicate that it is more commonly 
committed by the employer. A brief analysis of 
the numbers of failure to bargain cases for FY 
2007 gives a view of this. 8178 cases of 
employer failure to bargain were alleged for FY 
2007. The number for unions was 290. By the 
NLRBs own estimates, approximately 49% of 
these are initial contract cases. Additionally, 
where initial contracts are concerned, about 28% 
of these refusal to bargain cases are found to 
have merit. Consequently, it can be estimated 
that approximately 1120 of these refusal to 
bargain cases effect initial contracts and have 
merit.  
An analysis was conducted of data obtained 
from 118 cases where newly certified unions 
were seeking first contracts. In this study it is 
demonstrated, as with the organizing drive, that 
employer efforts at delaying the process will 
result in a decreased likelihood of an agreement. 
“It was shown that the NLRB delays in 
resolving employer objections and challenges to 
election results, and employer's refusal to 
bargain in good faith, and discrimination 
subsequent to election victories all substantially 
reduce the probability of agreement (Cooke, 
1985).”  Again, the issue of delay in current 
NLRB procedures is one of the driving forces 
behind proponents’ insistence on the EFCA's 
section on forced arbitration.  
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Management Tactics EFCA Attempts to 
Address 
Generally, there are several tactics that 
employers are alleged to use in effort to refuse to 
bargain with a newly established union. The 
most obvious is the outright refusal to bargain. 
This is a basic refusal to even acknowledge to 
existence of a bargaining relationship. The 
employer indicates a belief that the union, 
despite being certified, has no authority to 
bargain for the employees, and/or the employer 
has no duty to bargain with the union.  
Additionally, one of the parties might 
simply refuse to meet at reasonable times, or 
make unmanageable requests or demands as to 
how the process should be conducted, in an 
attempt to frustrate the process. Assigning 
bargaining agents who do not have sufficient 
authority is also a tactic used by both employers 
and unions. Employers may refuse to provide 
information necessary to the bargaining process, 
such as financial information that they are 
required to provide by case law. All of these 
issues would be referred to by the NLRB as 
refusal to bargain in good faith. 
Another common tactic employed by both 
employers and unions is “surface bargaining.” 
This is when one or both parties meet for the 
purpose of bargaining. Instead of intending to 
make a good faith effort of coming to an 
agreement, the party that is engaging in surface 
bargaining merely goes through the motions of 
the bargaining process. They make no real 
attempt to come to any agreement on the 
disputed issue or issues. It is important to 
remember that there is a distinction between this 
and “hard bargaining.” Hard bargaining is the 
right of both parties to reserve a strong position 
on an issue.  
Ultimately standards of good faith and bad 
faith have been defined through federal court 
and NLRB decisions. The consideration that 
must be met to prove bad faith is the totality of 
the conduct involved. Consequently, it is rare for 
the NLRB to make a determination of bad faith 
bargaining on the basis of one event. An 
investigation is generally conducted to the ends 
of discovering how willing the offending party 
seemed to be towards coming to an agreement. 
Forced Arbitration 
The second section of the Employee Free 
Choice Act is entitled, “Facilitating Initial 
Collective Bargaining Agreements.” What this 
section does is essentially compel the parties not 
only to the bargaining process, but also to the 
actual agreement. Specifically, this section 
provides for new recourse to establish a timely 
collective bargaining agreement. If after a period 
of ninety days from certification, the parties 
have not come to an agreement; either party can 
file for mediation and conciliation with the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. If 
an agreement is not resolved at that level, the 
FMCS, upon request of one of the parties, is to 
refer the matter to interest arbitration with the 
end result being a collective bargaining 
agreement to be in force for two years. 
It is this part of the legislation which is the 
most radical departure from the existing 
provisions of the NLRA. The existing law has 
sought to facilitate a process. It does so with 
generally no power or inclination to force an 
agreement. Once the parties have agreed to, or 
been compelled to bargain, they are free to use 
any legal means at their disposal to condition a 
collective bargaining agreement on favorable 
terms. The parties are free to use persuasion and 
economic pressure in the form of strikes or 
lockouts to achieve their ends.  
As with the election and recognition 
process, there are strong indications of employer 
and union misconduct during the negotiation of 
the first contract. The current system lends itself 
to this type of abuse by the very fact that the 
NLRA does not compel the parties to agree. The 
parties are only required to bargain. The 
requirement to bargain is specified in section 
8(d) of the NLRA. Specifically, collective 
bargaining is defined as the parties’ requirement, 
“...to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.” It is 
the vagueness of these terms that allows for the 
process to be confounded. 
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Initial contract negotiations are often more 
difficult than established successor contracts 
negotiations, since they frequently follow 
contentious representation election campaigns 
(Meisburg, 2006). It is reported that in 
approximately 32% of the cases where 
employees do gain union representation, they are 
unable to achieve a first contract (Broderdorf, 
2008). It is undeniable that this has to do with 
the parties taking inappropriate advantage of the 
weakness of the current legislation. Again, the 
spotlight seems to be on employers. According 
the Ronald Meisburg, “...our records indicate 
that the initial period after election and 
certification, charges alleging that employers 
have refused to bargain are meritorious in more 
than a quarter of all newly certified units (28%). 
Moreover, of all charges alleging employer 
refusals to bargain, almost half occur in initial 
contract bargaining situations (49.65%) 
(Meisburg, 2006).” 
This is a larger problem because at this stage 
of events, the union is still not produced a solid 
foundation. The NLRA allows for a period of 
protection for the union of one year to establish 
its first collective bargaining agreement. If after 
the expiration of this certification bar period, the 
union does not have an agreement in place, the 
union is susceptible to decertification. It would 
not be unlikely that newly unionized employees 
would have become disenchanted with the 
union, having failed to achieve its goals. 
Consequently, they would be naturally less 
inclined to continue to advocate for the union, 
and may seek decertification or replacement by 
another union. 
The question becomes is it appropriate to 
make such a radical departure from what has 
been the system provided for by the NLRA, and 
solidified in the rulings of the NLRB and 
various courts. That tradition has been to 
facilitate a process of bargaining. The NLRB 
and courts have been very careful to not cross 
over the boundary of the process to actually 
force any side to accept terms of an agreement. 
Indeed, it was held by the United States 
Supreme Court that, “..the [NLRB] does have 
the power under the National Labor Relations 
Act... to require employers and employees to 
negotiate, it is without power to compel a 
company or a union to agree to any substantive 
contractual provision of a collective bargaining 
agreement (H.K. Porter Co. Inc. v. NLRB, 1970) 
The parties have essentially been protected 
in their rights to hard bargaining. One such way 
this has been done is the courts handling of cases 
of “Boulwarism.” This is simply another name 
for last, best offer bargaining. The namesake for 
which was the Vice President of Labor Relations 
at General electric. “The employer's idea here is 
that a tortured process of give and take in which 
the employer is excoriated for its obstinacy and 
unreasonableness and gradually brought down to 
a modified position only enhances the prestige 
of the union and diminishes that of the employer 
(Gould, 2004).” This is not equated to bad faith 
bargaining because good faith bargaining does 
not require the parties to make proposals and 
counter proposals; it merely requires a good 
faith intent to consummate an agreement. A 
similar tactic that has also been constructively 
condoned is regressive bargaining. This is a 
system where one party indicates that a rejection 
of the proposed agreement by the other party 
will result in the first party's submission of a less 
attractive offer.  The courts and the NLRB have 
indicated that neither of these tactics, 
individually, would substantiate a claim of bad 
faith bargaining. Though considered with other 
factors, they might support such a claim. 
The Right to not Agree 
The primary objections by opponents of the 
EFCA regarding arbitration do not originate 
from the agreement itself. The concerns are that 
this process will inappropriately influence the 
content of these agreements. 
The EFCA section on mandatory arbitration 
would eliminate an important benefit that 
employers have enjoyed under the existing 
legislation. There has been an acknowledgement 
of the rights of the parties to not reach an 
agreement. In Chevron Oil V. NLRB, the court 
held that, “...If the insistence is genuinely and 
sincerely held, if it is not mere window dressing, 
it may be maintained forever though it produces 
a stalemate. Deep conviction firmly held and 
from which no withdrawal will be made, may be 
more than the traditional opening gambit of a 
labor controversy. It may be both the right of the 
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citizen and essential to our economic system...of 
free collective bargaining. The Government, 
through the [NLRB], may not subject the parties 
to direction either by compulsory arbitration or 
the more subtle means of determining that the 
position is inherently unreasonable, or unfair, or 
impracticable, or unsound.” The parties, having 
bargained in good faith, may be unable to reach 
an agreement on one or several issues. That 
having happened, the parties are said to have 
reached an impasse. Upon reaching an impasse, 
the employer is free to put into action provisions 
or an agreement that is consistent with their last, 
best offer to the employees. The employees are 
then free to put economic pressure on the 
employer to achieve an agreement they find 
more favorable. 
This section of the EFCA proposes the most 
dramatic change to the representation and 
bargaining process of the EFCA. Again, it is a 
radical departure from the current process. The 
NLRB decisions and federal case law have 
established a system where power and economic 
force are essentially the mechanisms which 
compel agreement with the NLRA merely 
guaranteeing that the process takes place. The 
EFCA proposes to eliminate this and force 
agreements on the parties. Consequently, there 
are strong arguments against adopting such a 
system.  
Constitutionality of Forced Arbitration 
The first argument in reference to this 
section of EFCA is that it is too vague. This is 
certainly a compelling position. The wording of 
the clause requires the parties submit to FMCS 
sponsored mediation and arbitration when they 
are unable to achieve a first collective 
bargaining agreement. It further tasks the FMCS 
with the burden of creating a system to facilitate 
this. It provides no guidelines or requirements as 
to how this is to be accomplished. Opponents of 
the EFCA find this disturbing as this is a fairly 
complicated process that creates an agreement 
that both parties will be subject to for a period of 
two years. It has been suggested that this would 
be an unconstitutional delegation of authority by 
congress. 
Article 1, Section1, of the constitution vests 
“all legislative powers herein granted...in a 
Congress of the United States.”  According to 
the Supreme Court, this “...text permits no 
delegation of [legislative] powers” and Congress 
must, at a minimum, “lay down by legislative 
act an intelligible principle to which the person 
or body authorized to act is directed to 
conform.” It is suggested that this is the case 
with EFCA.  As congress has asked the FMCS 
to create specific standards for arbitral awards 
without providing any “intelligible principle” to 
guide the agency. Congress has provided no 
structure regarding the complicated and 
important matter of arbitral standards 
(Broderdorf, 2008).  
The EFCA fails to provide such 
guidance or set forth an intelligible 
principle. The EFCA language simply states; 
“The service shall refer the dispute to an 
arbitration board established in accordance 
with such regulations as may be prescribed 
by the service.” It directs the FMCS to 
compose an arbitration board but does not 
expressly provide whether the FMCS should 
merely develop the procedural aspects of 
convening a board or whether it should develop 
substantive rules on the board’s decision-making 
power. Furthermore, it fails to constrain the 
FMCS’ rule-making authority. For all of these 
reasons, it is possible that the interest arbitration 
provision in the current version of the EFCA 
would not survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Essentially, the opinion is that congress is 
delegating too much authority to the FMCS 
without a specific guiding principle. This 
principle would be necessary to for the 
substantive and procedural guidelines of the new 
process.   
Clearly the authors of the EFCA intended 
this section to upset the power balance that 
occurs in first contract negotiations. 
Traditionally, this power has been held by the 
employer. It is the employer that controls the 
workplace, and the compensation. Forcing this 
arbitration is a mechanism to force the employer 
to surrender control in the form of management 
prerogative from the workplace. The intent is to 
try to level the playing field as the indication 
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from the NLRB's General Counsel is that the 
system is inappropriately out of balance. 
Another objection to the arbitration clause of 
the EFCA is put forth on the basis of potentially 
violating the constitution. The position is that 
the arbitration mandated by the act is an affront 
to the eminent domain section of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution. Essentially, it is 
posited that the current legislation compels the 
parties to bargain, but they retain their right to 
not agree, and walk away. As stated, the EFCA 
would force the parties to arbitration at this 
point. This would result in the government, 
through the FMCS, forcing an agreement where 
the employer is likely to make concessions for 
which it will not receive a reasonable return on 
capital (Epstein, 2008). This imposing costs on 
one party to provide non reciprocal benefits to 
others is a per se violation of the takings clause. 
This position makes a number of 
assumptions. First, should the parties proceed to 
FMCS forced arbitration; the agreement would 
be disproportionately in favor of the union. With 
no parameters included in the legislation for the 
FMCS to follow, this is an assumption not based 
in fact. Agreements could possibly favor 
employers, or simply set a sparse general 
framework for the parties to negotiate from at 
the expiration of the two year initial contract. In 
a purely economic analysis, it may be the case 
that the employer will be forced to pay increased 
compensation, but would possibly gain 
increased cooperation and productivity from 
workers. 
Proponents of this position have attempted 
to apply this logic to other forms of government 
mandated social welfare. These include 
minimum wage laws, unemployment, and 
employer's mandatory contributions to Social 
Security and Medicare (Gottesman, 2009). 
These conventions are accepted parts of 
American society. They have not been 
successful challenged as an affront to the 
constitution, nor are they likely to be. That being 
the case, it seems unlikely that should the EFCA 
pass, it would be successfully attacked on this 
issue. 
Unintended Impacts 
While this change may level the playing 
field to the benefit of unions, the possible 
negative effects on the process have to be 
considered. By forcing arbitration, the EFCA 
may cause bargaining behavior on the part of the 
parties that was not intended. The primary 
determinate of this will be if the parties in 
question think they are likely to get a better deal 
by negotiating, mediating, or arbitrating. 
The view of opponents is that while the 
NLRA's original purpose was to facilitate 
collective bargaining relationships, this section 
of the EFCA would actually have the opposite 
effect. Two conditions are alluded to which are 
essentially two sides of the same issue. First is 
that unions, believing that the FMCS will 
provide a middle ground agreement, will make 
outrageous demands for their first contract. They 
would essentially attempt to gain an 
unreasonably favorable agreement with the 
worst outcome being a fair agreement compelled 
by the FMCS. Conversely, to avoid arbitration, 
employers may concede to agreements that are 
less than fair to them to avoid the uncertainty of 
arbitration (Filipini & Kopolovich, 2009). 
Again, this argument presumes a position 
that the FMCS developed arbitration system 
would disproportionately benefit the unions. 
There is little indication that this is the case. 
However, the concept that the parties may not be 
as motivated to reach a bargained agreement is 
valid. This has been previously studied, and is 
commonly referred to as the “narcotic effect.” 
This is when interest arbitration creates 
dependency and weans employers and unions 
away from real collective bargaining (Singh & 
Dannin, 2006). 
Though this phenomenon has been studied, 
there are contrary findings. The narcotic effect 
has been analyzed in the public sector 
bargaining venue, as that is where interest 
arbitration is most prevalent. In analyzing this 
effect in the public sector, the reliance on 
interest arbitration has two effects. The first was 
documented in 1978. It consisted of an analysis 
of police and fire submission to arbitration in the 
wake of a law the mandated interest arbitration 
after impasse. In that study, the unions and 
employers was analyzed over a period of several 
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successive bargaining periods and agreements. It 
was determined that there is a “definite pattern 
of re-usage (a [positive] narcotic effect) (Chelius 
& Extejt, 1985).” Essentially, the finding was 
that unions and employers who had resorted to 
interest arbitration in previous bargaining rounds 
were prone to resort to it again. However, this 
was only significant for the first three 
agreements. 
This data was analyzed three times by 
different authors: Butler & Ehrnberg in 1981, 
Kochan and Baderschneider in 1978, and 
Chelius and Martin in 1985. Thought they did 
use the same data, different methodology was 
employed. In spite of this, the authors all came 
to the same results. The narcotic effect was 
prevalent early in the bargaining relationships. 
In those cases where the party had deferred to 
arbitration in the past, they were likely to do so 
again. However, this pattern only occurred early 
in the relationship. As the bargaining 
relationship matured, this effect was diminished. 
The tendency was away from deferral to 
arbitration and consequently to a bargaining 
agreement. Ultimately, it was asserted that, “The 
concern frequently expressed over the positive 
narcotic effect therefore appears to be 
exaggerated, if not groundless (Chelius & Extejt, 
1985). 
The implication is that parties in a mature 
bargaining relationship are motivated to avoid 
interest arbitration. This could be for a number 
of reasons. Hopefully, the parties are realistic 
and flexible in their negotiations. It could also be 
that the experience of submitting to interest 
arbitration is unsavory for the parties. This is 
because they are effectively surrendering control 
of the process to a disinterested party. The fear 
and uncertainty of having to accept a 
unfavorable agreement may be enough to 
motivate the parties to avoid the process 
altogether. Finally, it may be the case that the 
arbitration process itself is expensive, and the 
parties are inclined to avoid having to pay it. 
Essentially, the narcotic effect seems to be 
localized to early in the relationship. This may 
have serious implications for the EFCA 
arbitration clause, since agreements bargained as 
a result of it will all be from an immature 
relationship. In light of the research, how the 
parties will react cannot be definitely predicted. 
There is a strong indication to support the 
position of opponents of EFCA that unions will 
be susceptible to the narcotic effect. Again, this 
presumes that the FMCS would craft a system 
that disproportionately rewards unions for 
pushing bargaining to the point of mandated 
arbitration. If the FMCS determined policies 
disproportionately benefit the employers, it may 
be they who submit to the narcotic effect. 
Unions and employers will have to take their 
cues from the decisions that are made prior to 
their own situations. It will be incumbent on the 
FMCS to craft a fair and equitable system. This 
system must also be effective in dissuading the 
parties from applying for arbitration, thus 
facilitating bargaining. FMCS appointed 
arbitrators will have to work within this system 
to render decisions that will make the parties 
doubt a guaranteed positive outcome to the 
arbitration, and consequently have a healthy fear 
of this uncertainty. 
Again, this assumes that the US Congress, in 
passing the EFCA, still intends for collective 
bargaining to be the primary way of attempting 
to ensure labor stability. There may be a dual 
message contained in this section of the 
legislation. First, the EFCA is designed to 
encourage bargaining by only facilitating a first, 
two year contract. The parties will need to 
bargain for the successive ones. However, the 
legislation allows either party to file for 
arbitration after a period of approximately four 
months after union certification. This is an 
extremely abbreviated period as opposed to the 
one year certification bar period that the 
currently legislation allows for. Granted, it may 
be Congress' position that that period is too long. 
As previously stated, there is another side to 
the narcotic effect. EFCA opponents insist that 
employers who are bargaining in good faith will 
be punished. Consider that 68% of new unions 
do achieve first contracts. If this is the case, 
there are obvious impacts on those employers 
who are bargaining in good faith. As stated 
above, they are put under increased pressure to 
formulate an agreement before the matter is 
forwarded to the FMCS for mediation and 
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arbitration. The assumption is that employers, 
being traditionally in the position of power, will 
achieve less favorable agreements than they 
would were there no deadlines. 
EFCA opponents also make the position that 
of the remaining 32% of cases where a first 
contract is not achieved, only a positron of these 
employers are bargaining in bad faith. The 
balance are likely engaged in “hard bargaining” 
from a position of economic superiority. Again, 
the idea is put forward that they will be forced 
by the FMCS to accept an agreement less 
favorable than they could have achieved 
otherwise (Brodedorf, 2008).  
This position discounts the mediation 
portion of the process. It could be argued that 
when the matter is brought to mediation, the 
mediator would make a determination that the 
employer's position is realistic based on their 
level of power in the equation. Further, should 
the matter proceed to arbitration, it cannot be 
assumed that the arbitrator will act solely to the 
benefit of the employee. It may very likely be 
the case that the arbitrator will defer to a 
reasonable position of an employer who has 
submitted to the entire bargaining process in 
good faith. 
A suggestion is made by Broderdorf to 
revise this section of the EFCA. As stated above, 
it is his position that forced arbitration is 
essentially an unjust punishment to employers 
who have shown a tradition of good faith 
throughout the bargaining process with the new 
union. In an effort to make this a more fair 
aspect of the act, the authors should consider 
changing the EFCA so that a finding of bad faith 
is necessary before a new contract can be 
referred to FMCS for arbitration. This does seem 
to be a vary fair way of eliminating what might 
be a shortcoming of the EFCA. The problem 
with it is that injects another possibility of delay 
into the process. The NLRB would have to make 
a determination of bad faith bargaining. This 
process would undoubted protract the matter, 
and thus not solve the problems that caused the 
proposal of the EFCA in the first place. 
PENALTY 
The last section of the EFCA is the one that 
has gotten the least attention, and caused the 
least amount of controversy. This section is 
entitled, “Strengthening Enforcement,” as that is 
exactly what it does. For years critics have put 
forth the opinion that the NLRA did little by 
way of deterring illegal employer interference in 
organizing activity. The act itself laid out what 
was inappropriate, illegal conduct, but offered 
no significant penalty for that conduct. 
Rethinking the Make Whole Approach 
Authors of the new legislation have sought 
to remedy this, by all accounts, biggest 
shortcoming of the NLRA. As was stated in 
reference to section one of the act, the amount of 
employer interference in organizing does have a 
noticeable effect on it. Specifically, the 
documented tactic of termination of union 
activists employees in not uncommon, and is 
very effective. The current ramification for this 
is simply to reinstate the wrongfully terminated 
employee with back pay minus earnings. 
Specifically, the employee is restored to his 
position. He or she is then issued the money they 
would have been paid for the duration of the 
termination. This is referred to as a “make 
whole” approach. The employer gets to subtract 
from this amount what the employee earned at 
alternate employment during this period. 
Generally, this is not considered to be significant 
enough to deter offending employers from using 
this devastating tactic. It is believed that anti 
union consultants have advised employers to use 
this tactic. Little documentary evidence is 
available to reference this as the consultant 
would be advising the employer to engage in 
illegal activity.  
Increased penalties for this have been 
advocated for years. Robert Reich, US Secretary 
of Labor during the Clinton administration 
asserts, “We tried to penalize employers who 
broke the law, but the fines are minuscule,” and 
“The most important feature of the Employee 
Free Choice Act...toughens penalties against 
companies that violate their workers' rights 
(Reich, 2009).”  Leonard Page served as General 
Counsel for the NLRB from November 1999 to 
April 2001. In his criticism of the current 
process, he stated, “...the NLRA has not been 
fulfilling its intended purpose of protecting 
workers' section 7 rights for at least the last forty 
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years...the essential problem is delay and 
ineffective remedies (Page, 2005).” Page 
suggests additional damages against offending 
employers in the form of lost equity in property 
such as houses and cars in wrongful termination 
cases. These types of damages are routinely 
sought under other statutes and are clearly 
consistent with the “make whole” approach (id.). 
Triple Back Pay 
The EFCA's authors have sought to make 
this sort of activity more costly to employers. 
This part of the legislation is simple enough. The 
illegal termination of an employee by his 
employer for union activity would result in the 
employee being reinstated with back pay, and 
additionally, twice that amount as liquidated 
damages. The sole purpose of this measure is to 
make the prospect of interfering with union 
organizing by terminating employees too 
expensive a prospect. The authors of the EFCA 
further add to the deterrent value of this section. 
The have added a provision for an employer to 
be subject to a civil penalty for willfully and 
repeatedly committing unfair labor practices 
during organizing campaigns and first contract 
bargaining attempts. This penalty of up to 
$20,000 per occurrence would be in addition to 
any make whole remedies ordered by the board. 
Again, the purpose of this section is to 
dissuade employers from a certain course of 
action. That is terminating employee organizers 
and interfering in the organizing and first 
bargaining process in other inappropriate 
manners. By consequence, this could eliminate 
the delay associated with protracted proceedings 
on this matter. As previously stated, a delay in 
these processes works to the benefit of the 
employers. The delay causes the union 
momentum to lose speed, and the participants to 
lose interest. Where in the other sections, the 
EFCA attempts to streamline the process to 
eliminate delay, this section attempts to 
eliminate the cause of the delay. 
This section of the EFCA receives the least 
criticism from opponents. This is because it 
would be hard for even the most management 
oriented observer to decry these measures. If one 
believes that these violations are occurring to 
any degree, it would be very difficult to support 
a position that the current penalties are 
appropriate for so overt a violation of the law. If 
one believes that these infractions are not 
significant, then the magnitude of the penalties 
would not be an issue, as they have no bearing 
on the process. Since it has been demonstrated 
that these complaints are made to the NLRB, 
and a significant percentage are found to have 
merit, the former position is the most likely. 
No Penalties for Unions 
That is not to imply that there is no criticism 
for this section of the EFCA. In regards to this, 
the following observation has been made: “At 
the same time, the EFCA does not provide for 
any increased penalties or remedies against a 
union that commits unfair labor practices against 
the employees or the employer. While 
proponents claim that the EFCA is meant to 
protect employees from intimidation or 
harassment in their representation choice, it fails 
to provide an increased deterrent against union 
authorization card abuses despite the heightened 
significance placed on cards (Filipini & 
Kopolovich, 2009).” This argument reverts to 
the position that the NLRA and the EFCA are 
intended to extend rights, benefits, and penalties 
equally to the members of the bargaining 
relationship. It discounts the position that those 
laws are in fact designed to level the playing 
field where the employer will almost always 
have a decided advantage and a pronounced 
position of power. 
Still this position may not be without merit 
if the agenda is to streamline the process, and 
mitigate delay. A cause of this delay is 
misconduct on the part of both parties resulting 
in unfair labor practices. It would seem prudent 
to perhaps dissuade unions from engaging in 
inappropriate activities that may result in 
proceedings that protract the process. Of specific 
concern is the new organizing, or card check 
system. The anecdotal evidence does indicate 
that some abuse in the form of misinformation 
and coercion is occurring. To what level this 
occurs is debatable. What is likely though is that 
if the system is modified in such a way that 
increased inappropriate activity can occur, it will 
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likely occur. As organizers are put under 
pressure to successfully organize, some will 
respond to this pressure by engaging in 
inappropriate activity to achieve the outcome 
that is expected.  
The addition of penalties for this may be 
appropriate in the case of non employee 
organizers. Their parent organizations could be 
sanctioned in some manner. The problem would 
be for employee organizers. If these organizers 
were subject to such allegations, and penalties 
were attached, this could be perverted into 
another system used to thwart union organizing 
attempts. False allegation against employees and 
organizers could intimidate them into 
abandoning their campaign, and frustrate the 
entire process with more proceedings resulting 
in more delays. Any attempts at crafting 
legislation in regards to penalties to unions and 
organizers needs to be very carefully considered 
and worded. 
Unintended Impact 
While these penalties will certainly offer a 
deterrent value to some employers, it will not 
likely be consistent throughout the country. The 
structure of the penalties under the EFCA is 
regressive in that it will have a greater impact on 
companies with less capital available. The civil 
penalties allow for adjustment up to the sum of 
$20,000 for each occurrence. However, the 
“make whole” remedy mandates the award of 
triple back pay, with the added amount 
representing damages to the employee. There is 
no discretion provided for to adjust this amount 
based on the employers’ ability to pay. More 
financially stable employers will realize a lower 
deterrent value than ones less so under this 
structure, as they would be better able to weather 
the impact of having the wrongful termination 
allegation sustained. 
There will doubtlessly be other impacts on 
these types of unfair labor practices. The 
question of the increased penalty's impact on the 
NLRB's adjudication of these matters needs to 
be considered. Will the increased penalties result 
in a higher standard of proof being sought to 
sustain such a case. Under the current 
legislation, the board can sustain the allegation 
of an unfair labor practice if it is shown to have 
occurred by a “preponderance of the evidence 
(NLRA Section10(c)).” This is a lower standard 
of proof applied by courts under common law. 
Its meaning is that the event is more likely to 
have occurred than not. In a more quantitative 
explanation, there would be 51% or more 
indication by the evidence that the event has 
occurred. This is a very subjective standard. 
The effect of increased penalties on 
standards of proof was considered in reference 
to anti-trust legislation in 1990. That study 
considered the impact of Congress' increasing 
penalties for anti-trust violations from the 
misdemeanor to the felony level. An analysis 
was conducted of pre and post legislation cases. 
The findings indicated that in addition to the 
deterrent effect that Congress intended, there 
were other factors that reduced the number of 
prosecutions. One was the more vigorous 
defenses mounted by the accused.  
The other was in the form of unfavorable 
changes in conviction rules in the form of 
increased standard of proof (Snyder, 1990). 
Since the existing standard of proof is so 
subjective and low, it is entirely likely that the 
EFCA provision would meet the same result and 
induce a requisite higher burden of proof. The 
increased penalties add to the gravity of the 
situation, so the courts respond to a perceived 
obligation to be more diligent in their findings.  
That study suggests that “...more attention 
should be focused on how higher penalties affect 
other dimensions of individual behavior and the 
enforcement process (id.).” Additional resources 
may have to be diverted to investigation. 
Ordinarily, this would be expected to result in 
more delay in the organization and first contract 
processes. This is not the case as the EFCA's 
authors’ added language to mitigate the impact 
of any delay as a result of this by providing for 
injunctions. 
Injunctions 
The penalty section of the EFCA allows for 
injunctive relief for cases of employer 
interference with organizing and first contract 
bargaining. This is not the case under the 
existing legislation. Under the existing 
legislation, Section 10(l) allows for the NLRB to 
petition the local federal District court for 
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injunctive relief for certain employee unfair 
labor practices. These include secondary 
boycotts (A secondary boycott is an attempt by 
labor to convince others to stop doing business 
with a particular firm because that firm does 
business with another firm that is the subject of a 
strike and/or a primary boycott) and hot cargo 
agreements (an agreement between labor and an 
employer barring the employer from using or 
otherwise dealing with the products of another 
employer whose employees are nonunion). 
This is a change that labor proponents have 
been advocating for years (Bronfenbrenner, 
1994). Again, this legislation is designed to get 
the worker back to work, and eliminate delay 
from the process. 
Employers would likely be concerned with 
how these injunctions would impact them when 
they attempt to terminate problem and/or 
disruptive employees. In considering this, it is 
important to remember that EFCA only applies 
this injunctive relief to employees during the 
organization and first contract process. If those 
processes are not underway when the allegation 
is made, an injunction is not available. However, 
it would likely be the case that during those 
processes, employees who do not qualify for this 
injunctive relief will assert a right to it. The 
resulting consequence would be the 
inconvenience of an employer having to justify 
the dismissal as a performance issue and not anti 
union activity. Further, the employer would have 
to defend against a false allegation of an unfair 
labor practice. This is another example of the 
authors of the EFCA crafting the legislation to 
strengthen the employees’ ability to organize to 
the possible detriment of the employer. The 
overriding principle of disproportionately 
favoring the employees in an effort to level the 
playing field. 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
Representative Miller, the EFCA's sponsor, 
has made statements clearly indicating a belief 
that not only are workers better served by being 
in unions, but also that allowing workers to join 
unions will revitalize the US economy. “The 
EFCA will help rebuild our nations' middle class 
and make our economy work for everyone 
again.” “In order have a fair sustainable 
economic recovery; workers have to be able to 
bargain for decent wages and benefits (Rep. 
Miller, 2009).” Consequently, Rep. Miller has 
equated this legislation to a necessary tool for 
producing a recovery from the current poor 
economic condition in the US. Similarly, 
Senator Edward Kennedy, a cosponsor who 
introduced EFCA to the senate indicates, “It's a 
critical step toward putting the economy back on 
track... (Sen. Kennedy, 2009).” The implication 
is that workers, particularly those in the middle 
class, need to be in unions, to secure better 
compensation, and consequently cause a US 
economic recovery. Based on this it becomes 
difficult to conceptualize the impact of the 
EFCA without at least exploring the debate 
about the large scale economic benefits of 
unionization. Clearly, Rep. Miller indicates that 
middle class workers are better served by being 
in unions, and he and Senator Kennedy believe 
that this is a necessary component of a US 
economic recovery.  
It is clearly indicated through the statistical 
reference of the Department of Labor's Bureau 
of Labor Statistics that, on average, workers in 
unions are compensated at higher rates than 
those who are not unionized. In addition to this, 
it is consistently cited that workers in unions are 
more likely to have health insurance (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2009). 
Initially, when the Employee Free Choice 
Act was proposed in 2007, the impetus was to 
make it so that the middle class would be made 
better off through corresponding wage increases. 
The current economic turmoil of 2009 has 
caused the bill's proponents to modify their 
position somewhat. It is now presented that the 
EFCA will facilitate easier unionization, leading 
to increased wages for the middle class, 
resulting in an economic recovery as the middle 
class will be economically empowered to 
facilitate it.  
Can the Economic Impact be Predicted? 
There is very little information available to 
assist with a formation of a theory on what the 
large scale economic effect of EFCA will be in 
the U.S. One study has been put forward by 
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Anne Layne-Farrar, an economist of LECG, a 
private consulting group. In her research, she has 
studied the effect of the shift to the card check 
system from an election system in certain 
Canadian provinces. Canada was chosen for the 
comparison not only because of the recent shifts 
to card check, but also because of “...the 
remarkable similarities in industrial structure 
and the economic integration between the US 
and Canada allow us to use the Canadian 
experience as natural experiment for the US 
economy (Lane-Farrar, 2009).” 
According to the study, An Empirical 
Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act: 
The Economic Implications, an increase in 1.5 
million union members in one year would lead 
to the loss of 600,000 jobs by the following 
year. Jobs losses directly attributed to the 
passage of card check legislation would be equal 
to the entire population of Boston or seventy-
five percent of San Francisco. Dr. Layne-Farrar 
further notes that if Andy Stern’s (National 
President of the Service Employees International 
Union) prediction were to come true then 
"...unemployment is predicted to rise between 
5.3 and 6.2 million (Layne-Farrar, 2009).” The 
study indicates a basic shift in labor demand. It 
presumes that as the cost of an employee 
increases due to union induced increased 
compensation, the demand for workers at the 
higher price will be lower. Consequently, this 
decreased demand will manifest itself as 
increased unemployment. 
EFCA proponents have taken to discrediting 
this study. The House Committee on Education 
and Labor has indicated that...”This is a bogus 
study bankrolled by the very lobbyists pumping 
millions into efforts to defeat this bill (EFCA 
Myth v. Fact, 2009).” They go on to cite that the 
US experienced one of its greatest economic 
expansions during the 50's and 60's during the 
highest rate of unionization. It is further 
indicated that during that time union density was 
at a high of approximately 30%, and 
unemployment was about 4.5%. Unfortunately, 
as previously stated, that United States does not 
exist anymore. The cold war has ended, and the 
US industrial base that reigned during that 
period has all but been completely off-shored. 
Additional perspective is gained by keeping in 
mind that that committee is chaired by Rep. 
George Miller, the lead sponsor of the EFCA. 
There is some evidence as to the effect of 
recent unionization on individual employers. 
The study in question was an analysis conducted 
comparing businesses that became unionized by 
narrow margins and those that defeated 
unionization by narrow margins (Dinardo & 
Leep, 2004). This was done for organization 
attempts occurring from 1984 to 2001. Their 
analysis indicated that, “that in the last twenty 
years, newly formed unions have had very little 
effect on firms' “bottom line” (id.).” In the 
findings, this lack of impact is attributed to the 
diminished power nationally of unions over that 
period in the face of employers. However, there 
is a shortcoming in the study in reference to 
applying it to the potential effect of the EFCA. 
Unions have a tendency to target highly 
profitable employers who are likely to grow and 
pay higher rates of compensation. Consequently, 
this study does not translate well to the economy 
as a whole that is populated by strong and weak 
enterprises.  
Consequently, there is no clear, objective 
economic analysis of the large scale effect of the 
EFCA. The opinions that are presented are 
partisan. Also, they assume that the EFCA 
would cause a large scale wage increase in the 
US. There is no basis for this assumption. Newly 
certified unions and employees may be able to 
effectively and reasonably bargain and craft 
agreements that allow for prosperity. If not, 
there is no reason to assume that FMCS 
appointed arbitrators will defer to a policy of 
increasing wages for employees. Opponents and 
proponents of the act together must bear in mind 
that financial gains and monetary benefits are 
not the best feature of unionization and 
collective bargaining agreements. 
WORKPLACE STABILITY 
If the potential compensation and large scale 
economic impacts are set aside, we can consider 
what many labor activists consider to be the real 
benefits to union organizing and first contracts. 
It is not increased wages and compensation. It is 
the job security and “basic rights” that make 
these agreements a significant victory for 
workers (Juravich et. al., 2006). Grievance 
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procedures provide for these basic rights and 
replace what is referred to as arbitrary employer 
control in the workplace (id). It is also by this 
mechanism that the employer is forced to 
surrender a significant portion of their flexibility 
to run an efficient enterprise. 
Efficiency does not have to be sacrificed. It 
is suggested that how management reacts to the 
new agreements can make the determination on 
the productivity of the workplace in the post 
collective bargaining agreement period. This is 
indicated in a study of 6 cement plants that 
became organized at different periods from 1953 
to 1976 (Clark, 1980). A union productivity 
effect was documented. It was the authors 
determination that the management in these 
locations adjusted to unionization in such a way 
that they were able to establish a more 
productive workplace in the post collective 
bargaining agreement period. 
This change in management style is 
exhibited in the statement made by one manager 
that, before the union, the workplace was run 
like a family, now it is run like a business (id.). 
This could have many connotations. In this 
instance it may have been negative. But from 
this statement one can infer that the union 
created a condition where management was 
force to act in such a way as to take a more 
formal stance at the workplace. “The union 
wage [increase] creates incentives for 
management to extract more work effort from a 
given level of employees(id).” The employers 
introduced systems of production goals 
accompanied by performance review systems. 
Additionally, staff meetings were initiated which 
were used for communications, training, and 
assessment of conditions and progress. 
Either way, the situation is likely to become 
more stable. This is because if the bargaining 
process is referred to mandatory arbitration, 
there will likely be grievance arbitration 
imposed. The employees will be able to have 
their legitimate complaints heard in whatever 
forum is laid out in the agreement. This will 
undoubtedly have a positive impact on their 
morale. In return, the employer automatically 
gets a “no strike provision” in the agreement. 
The employers would not be able to attempt to 
apply economic pressure, or contest alleged 
unfair labor practices by the traditional method 
of a strike. As is guaranteed by case law, the 
employees would have to submit this issues to 
arbitration. A more stable system is the end 
result of such an arrangement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Employee Free Choice Act, by all 
accounts, has the capacity to increase the rate of 
unionization in the United States. Central to its 
ability to do so is the elimination of the delay 
that impacts the union organization and 
certification processes, as well as the bargaining 
of the first contract. The proposed changes in 
certification will provide the effect that the 
EFCA's authors intend by streamlining the 
process. This will facilitate greater success rates, 
and encourage greater numbers of organizing 
drives. Additionally, the guarantee of a first 
contract for all successfully certified unions will 
provide for additional incentives for employees 
to attempt to organize. The increased deterrents 
provided for with the EFCA will help organizers 
to operate more efficiently in the organizing 
process, as much of the employer induced 
coercion will be removed. 
Having achieved that, employers and unions 
in the United States would have to deal with the 
potential unintended consequences of the EFCA. 
While the prospect of employer induced threats 
and coercion will be mitigated, there will be 
increased likelihood of organizers and pro union 
employees exerting inappropriate pressure on 
their fellow workers to sign authorization cards.  
Additionally, there will be reduced options 
available to those workers who would refrain 
from being associated with a union.  
Also, mandatory arbitration of first contracts 
could induce a negative impact on the collective 
bargaining process in the form of a narcotic 
effect. This measure does have some potential to 
adversely affect the bargaining process to the 
detriment of both unions and employers. The 
lack of clear procedural guidelines for the FMCS 
to conduct mandatory arbitrations results in 
uncertainty as to how well the EFCA will serve 
to maintain a stable US workplace. If a tendency 
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to favor one side over the other develops, 
collective bargaining will be subverted. 
Increasing penalties for wrongful 
terminations is appropriate, but could have the 
impact of requiring a higher burden of proof to 
sustain such charges. This would require more 
comprehensive and thorough investigations of 
such charges. The result could be increased 
expense, and charges not being found to have 
merit that would have under the existing 
legislation. 
Finally, the true economic impact of this 
legislation cannot be predicted. The assumption 
that mass unionization will result in universally 
higher wages and by consequence, facilitate 
economic recovery are based on supposition and 
not supported with facts. It is suggested, and 
must be considered that the opposite, negative 
economic impact could occur. More analysis of 
this potential impact is in order.  
That aside, it must be kept in mind that the 
biggest gains for employees will come not from 
increased compensation, but from increased 
rights in the workplace. Through collective 
bargaining agreements employees will receive 
more stability and security in their employment. 
This will be at the cost of employers 
surrendering a portion of their management 
rights in those same agreements. Whether the 
impact on the workplace is positive or negative 
depends on how the unions and employers 
choose to interact. 
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